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PARTICIPATORY PLANNING AND PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS: 
THE CASE FOR DEEPER PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN URBAN 
REDEVELOPMENT 
DAMON Y. SMITH* 
ABSTRACT 
For decades legal and planning commentators have advocated a deeper and 
more meaningful level of public participation in urban revitalization efforts.  
The result of such advocacy has increased the use of public participation as a 
criterion for awarding federal redevelopment funds but has had little impact 
on participatory requirements in state redevelopment law.  This article 
explores the theoretical arguments in favor of increased public participation in 
the redevelopment context and finds that there is an overemphasis on direct 
democracy arguments and the “empowerment” theory, a concept that belies 
simple definition.  This article explores the intrinsic and instrumental benefits 
of public participation and finds that participatory planning is beneficial as a 
legitimizing form of deliberation in governance, but only when used as a 
supplement to, rather than a replacement for politically accountable legislative 
authorities.  This understanding of the role of participatory planning provides 
a more convincing rhetorical and normative regime that justifies the 
difficulties that arise when granting greater resident control of redevelopment 
and further legitimizes the planning process in a way that is legally cognizable 
by courts reviewing urban redevelopment plans.  As a result, this article 
describes the need for more robust procedural legal rights that would allow 
low-income residents to resist redevelopment in those instances where the 
goals of participatory planning are not attained due to government corruption 
or inattention to public input.  This new rhetorical and normative regime is 
tested against actual urban redevelopment planning methods used in Camden, 
New Jersey and East St. Louis, Illinois.  This article suggests specific changes 
to state redevelopment laws that would enshrine deeper public participation 
 
* Assistant Professor, Rutgers School of Law-Camden.  I am grateful for the assistance of my 
wife, Janine Jones Smith, the Rutgers School of Law-Camden Junior Faculty and Senior Faculty 
Colloquia participants, Ken Reardon and the student editors at the Saint Louis University School 
of Law’s Public Law Review.  Any remaining errors or omissions in this article are entirely my 
own. 
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values and concludes with an eye towards the additional research and 
advocacy necessary for achieving those changes. 
I.  INTRODUCTION - THE COMMUNITY PLANNER’S CONUNDRUM 
Imagine the dilemma of a modern urban planner in a severely distressed 
American riverfront city.  Her community, which was once a bustling 
industrial powerhouse whose geographic advantages made it the locus of 
transnational rail and river cargo shipments, is now a shell of its former self.  
The population had grown steadily after the turn of the 20th century as 
European immigrants and African American migrants from the South were 
attracted to the city’s plentiful employment opportunities for low-skilled 
workers.1  The population and industrial productivity, however, peaked in the 
early 1950s.2 
Post WWII, a shift occurred in the economy and new development was 
catalyzed by construction of the interstate highway system, decreasing the need 
for rail and ship cargo while also providing a means of escape for those 
interested in moving away from the industrial pollution and overcrowded 
housing conditions in urban centers.3  Aided by federal housing programs that 
favored suburban tract housing, redlining banks that refused to lend in areas 
populated with a majority of racial minorities and unscrupulous Realtors who 
played on racial fears, the city bled residents at increasing rates throughout the 
next two decades.4 
By the 1980s, “white flight” had turned into “green flight” with almost all 
residents of means fleeing the community’s rapidly rising rates of 
unemployment, poverty, and crime.5  The city that had once been considered a 
 
 1. See Nell Irvin Painter, Foreword to THE GREAT MIGRATION IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE: NEW DIMENSIONS OF RACE, CLASS AND GENDER viii–ix (Joe W. Trotter, Jr. ed., 
1991); Joe William Trotter, Jr., Introduction. Black Migration in Historical Perspective: A 
Review of the Literature, in THE GREAT MIGRATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: NEW 
DIMENSIONS OF RACE, CLASS AND GENDER 1, 5–7 (Joe W. Trotter, Jr. ed., 1991). 
 2. See Peter Gottlieb, Rethinking the Great Migration: A Perspective from Pittsburgh, in 
THE GREAT MIGRATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: NEW DIMENSIONS OF RACE, CLASS AND 
GENDER 68, 78–79 (Joe W. Trotter, Jr. ed., 1991). 
 3. See, KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 190–209 (1985). 
 4. See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
1095, 1122 (2007) (“Through its creation of the interstate highway system and the discriminatory 
policies of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which would not guarantee mortgages in 
urban or racially integrated neighborhoods, government policy both lured and pushed investment 
capital out of inner cities and into outlying areas.  Following the path laid by the FHA, private 
mortgage lenders simply refused to lend money for the construction or upkeep of properties 
within many urban neighborhoods.”). 
 5. Sheryll D. Cashin, Drifting Apart: How Wealth and Race Segregation Are Reshaping the 
American Dream, 47 VILL. L. REV. 595, 597–98 (2002) (“About half of the one-hundred largest 
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regional economic engine with name-brand company headquarters became 
better known for its label as “Murder Capital” of the nation.6  By the last 
decade of the 20th Century, the city government, long considered corrupt, was 
unable to balance a budget with a dwindling tax base and the state intervened 
by taking control of the local school district and most municipal functions.7 
Given this history, our modern community planner is faced with two 
common choices in community economic development practice.  On the one 
hand, she could pursue a bottom-up strategy by convincing municipal officials 
and local residents to engage in a participatory planning process designed to 
facilitate resident input into the development of neighborhood and community 
revitalization plans.  In the alternative, she could pursue a top-down strategy 
by packaging public powers, such as eminent domain and tax abatement, to 
entice private developers to pick neighborhoods to develop according to plans 
that the municipality could then adopt with little or no community 
consultation. 
The state’s redevelopment law appears neutral on its face to either 
decision, but the planner notes that the public participation requirements 
enshrined in that law could easily be met with only one or two public 
hearings.8  In addition, the state redevelopment law provides few procedural 
protections that residents of low-income communities could use to successfully 
fight against redevelopment or the municipality’s right to use eminent domain 
in such an economic development context.9 
The hypothetical above roughly describes the development trajectories of 
East St. Louis, Illinois and Camden, New Jersey, which are two of this nation’s 
most economically distressed communities.  Despite their similarities, these 
cities have followed different paths in terms of redevelopment planning and 
 
metro areas became majority-minority . . . in no small part because of the widespread 
suburbanization of the white middle class . . . . All racial groups are rapidly moving to the 
suburbs.”). 
 6. See Editorial, Gary Drops to 9th on List of Most Dangerous, POST-TRIBUNE, Nov. 21, 
2005, at A1 (describing Camden, NJ as the most dangerous city in America); Beth Hundsdorfer, 
St. Clair County Reports Fewer Homicides in ‘04 Number Falls from 33 to 31, BELLEVILLE 
NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Jan. 1, 2005, at 1A (describing East St. Louis’ former designation as most 
dangerous city in America). 
 7. Laura M. Litvan, States Try to Rescue School, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Feb. 17, 1998, 
at A1 (“After years of watching the school board in East St. Louis fail to improve one of Illinois’ 
worst school districts, state officials had had enough.  They took over the district.  The state set 
up a management panel four years ago to control all of the school system’s financial decisions.”); 
Melanie Burney & Dwight Ott, Judge Allows Camden Recovery Act, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 
Mar. 19, 2003, at B1 (“In a major victory for the McGreevey administration, a state judge 
yesterday upheld New Jersey’s $175 million plan to revitalize Camden and seize unprecedented 
control over the city’s daily operations and school board.”). 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
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community participation, with East St. Louis following the participatory 
planning route and Camden following the top-down planning approach.10  This 
article explores part of the legal framework giving rise to the choices described 
above and advocates for a change in that framework to favor the participatory 
approach. 
The central thesis of this article is that deeper participatory planning 
procedures, as defined below, should be included in state redevelopment laws 
in recognition that the planning process serves a number of important 
functions.  These functions include: 1) legitimizing economic redevelopment 
decisions in the eyes of the public and the judiciary; 2) providing important 
procedural legal protections for residents who live in distressed communities; 
and 3) providing an opportunity for low-income residents to share in the 
benefits of redevelopment.  Although the legal literature often describes public 
participation in economic development planning as exemplary of purely direct 
democracy and empowerment principles, this article is animated by the belief 
that a rhetorical shift to emphasize how participatory planning adds value to 
the decisions ultimately made by elected legislative bodies, and provides a 
more legally coherent rhetorical and theoretical framework to justify such 
participation. 
As a former neighborhood planner, I have faced the planner’s dilemma 
described above.  I recognize the need to protect the rights of individual 
community residents impacted by redevelopment efforts and the need to 
protect the use of eminent domain as a necessary economic development tool 
to arrest urban decay.  This article proposes a participatory planning process 
that strikes a balance between those who argue for elimination of eminent 
domain, for economic development purposes, and the overuse and abuse of 
eminent domain powers that have plagued urban communities for decades.  
Participatory planning can provide a forum of deliberation and discussion that 
informs and legitimizes urban redevelopment efforts and simultaneously serve 
as a bulwark against overreaching by redevelopment advocates. 
Before launching into this project, it is necessary to define “participatory 
planning.”  This article adopts the belief that participatory planning, properly 
understood, is a process rather than an end of itself.11  In terms of breadth and 
depth, planners must endeavor to include local community leaders, business 
owners, nonprofits, homeowners, tenants, landlords and other impacted 
individuals in an iterative and interactive series of pre-development activities 
designed to share information and garner community opinion and preferences.  
In addition, it requires municipal officials, urban planners and design 
 
 10. See discussion infra at Part V.B. 
 11. For a larger description of participatory planning as process, see generally JOHN 
FORESTER, THE DELIBERATIVE PRACTITIONER: ENCOURAGING PARTICIPATORY PLANNING 
PROCESSES (1999). 
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professionals to conduct a series of surveys, focus groups, design charettes and 
community workshops.  In sum, a truly successful participatory planning 
process requires that redevelopment agencies provide: 1) multiple engagement 
forums to share data, collect information, and gather opinions; 2) a focus on 
collaboration and deliberation in the determination of community preferences 
and potential outcomes prior to the designation of an area as one in need of 
redevelopment; and 3) a feedback mechanism to allow participants to gauge 
responsiveness to community concerns in a manner that prevents erosion of 
trust, participation and collaboration over successive events. 
Part II of this article provides a brief history of urban renewal efforts and 
describes the public participation requirements added to redevelopment laws in 
light of urban renewal failures.  Part III explores the structure of public 
participation requirements in modern state redevelopment laws, with particular 
emphasis on the shallow nature of the participation and the importance placed 
on the accountability of elected bodies. 
Part IV reviews the controversial U.S. Supreme Court case Kelo v. City of 
New London, where a bare 5-4 majority upheld the use of eminent domain for 
purely economic development purposes as consistent with the Fifth 
Amendment protection against the taking of private property for public use 
without just compensation.  This part emphasizes that the majority opinion 
rests upon an underlying belief in the legitimacy of the comprehensive 
economic development planning processes due to interplay of public 
engagement and the imprimatur of a politically accountable legislature.  This 
participatory planning process can be summarized as one involving careful 
formulation, thorough deliberation, public outreach, and public education. 
Part V describes the use of direct democracy and empowerment theory by 
scholars to justify public participation and suggests the utility of using 
arguments that are more consistent with the goals of participatory planning 
defined above and the legitimizing role of legislative authority described by the 
Kelo majority. 
Part VI describes recent changes to state redevelopment laws as a result of 
Kelo that have increased substantive legal protections for middle- and upper-
income communities faced with redevelopment without providing any 
additional protections for low-income communities. 
Part VII advocates the strengthening of procedural protections afforded 
low-income community residents targeted by redevelopment efforts by 
enshrining participatory planning principles into state redevelopment law. 
Parts VIII and IX explore the arguments in this article through the lens of 
deep participatory planning utilized in East St. Louis, Illinois and top-down 
planning utilized in Camden, New Jersey. 
Part X concludes this article with an eye towards the next steps in research 
and advocacy, which are needed to implement this article’s recommendations. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
248 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX:243 
II.  BRIEF HISTORY OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
For decades, urban redevelopment projects have been controversial 
because they were catalysts for the dissolution of low-income urban 
communities, particularly low-income communities of color.12  The urban 
renewal projects of the 1950s and 1960s were often hailed by business interests 
as long overdue reinvestments in urban centers and assailed by community 
groups as land grabs by powerful state and private interests at the expense of 
the urban poor.13  The initial urban renewal programs were dubbed “Negro 
Removal” by opponents because they had, at best, a disparate racial impact, 
and, at worst, they seemed to equate physical blight with the presence of an 
assumed human blight.14 
In all, it has been estimated that the first two decades of urban renewal 
resulted in the displacement of more than 200,000 urban households, 
disproportionately impacting low-income African Americans.15 
Commentators still lament the loss of community and social support 
structures that resulted from the demolition of deteriorated housing in the name 
of progress.16  The shining towers of public housing built pursuant to those 
 
 12. See Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle”: Local-
Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 38 (2006) (“The 
displacement of low-income communities accomplished by urban redevelopment law and 
practice in the U.S. continues the inequities of urban renewal and targets ‘low-mobility 
populations’ – those mostly poor and minority city residents who toil in the background in the 
office towers and tourist spots.”); Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban 
Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 46 (2003) 
(“Urban renewal . . . was an economic development program with profound racial implications.”). 
 13. Pritchett, supra note 12, at 37–47. 
 14. Id. at 47.  See also Ilya Somin, Why Robbing Peter Won’t Help Poor Paul: Low-Income 
Neighborhoods and Uncompensated Regulatory Takings, 117 YALE L.J. 71, 72–73 (Supp. 2007), 
available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/content/view/1587/123 (“[U]rban renewal, and 
‘blight’ condemnations have often disproportionately targeted low-income neighborhoods.  Since 
World War II, some three to four million low-income Americans have been displaced by such 
condemnations.  In the 1960s, urban renewal takings were sometimes referred to as ‘negro 
removal,’ because so many of them targeted poor African Americans.  Such takings continue to 
victimize poor communities to this day.”) (citation omitted). 
 15. See Amanda W. Goodin, Note, Rejecting the Return to Blight in Post-Kelo Legislation, 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 200–01 (2007) (“In the 1950s and 1960s, cities across the country 
engaged in massive urban renewal projects that relied heavily on the use of eminent domain.  
Major sections of many cities were demolished and rebuilt.  Throughout its course and across the 
country, the urban renewal movement resulted in the displacement of ‘177,000 families and 
another 66,000 single individuals, most of them poor and most of them black.’”) (citation 
omitted). 
 16. See J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban 
Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 569 (2007) (“Eliminated buildings 
sometimes lacked basic plumbing and sanitation, which was always provided in the new public 
housing, but urban renewal displaced many poor people from functioning communities that 
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redevelopments to house the urban poor were not the solution and, more often 
than not, became the “blight” that was later demolished to make way for even 
newer redevelopment schemes.17 
The continued use of urban redevelopment can partly be traced to these 
temporary successes in replacing physically deteriorated structures, but there 
was an insidious understanding that part of the blight in need of excising was 
the poor residents of color themselves.18  Most displaced residents were 
relocated to other impacted and impoverished neighborhoods in the region 
without any opportunity to enjoy the benefits promised by their revitalized and 
rebuilt neighborhood.19 
These early planning and development failures led to legal reforms in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s that amended federal redevelopment laws, requiring 
greater public participation and relocation assistance for those residents 
impacted by urban renewal.20  Municipalities and redevelopment officials 
reacted cynically to these federal requirements and, in a legacy that endures to 
this day, often provided insufficient notice of perfunctory hearings at times and 
locations inconvenient to those ultimately impacted by the proposed 
redevelopment.21 
 
helped sustain them.  The new construction tended to adopt self-defeating forms of architecture 
and streetscape that undermined and rendered dangerous public space.”) (citations omitted); 
Bezdek, supra note 12, at 67–68 (“[I]f the redevelopment area requires the relocation of residents, 
these residents leave not only the familiar roofs but also streets, friends, neighbors, churches, 
child care arrangements, schools and transit routes.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Amy Widman, Replacing Politics with Democracy: A Proposal for Community 
Planning in New York City and Beyond, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 135, 157 n.84 (2002). 
 18. Byrne & Diamond, supra note 16, at 569 (“Subsidized housing programs often have 
pursued some notion of urban vitality.  Urban renewal demolished ‘blighted’ low-income housing 
and replaced it with modern public housing.  The architects of urban renewal believed that 
excision of blight, like the surgical removal of a gangrenous limb, would enhance urban vitality.  
Although in practice blight became a term of elasticity, allowing removal of anything believed to 
stand in the way of desired projects, it properly denotes sites with a negative economic value.  
This also takes into account the effects on surrounding properties.  These projects had some 
successes and many legendary disasters.”) (citations omitted). 
 19. Bezdek, supra note 12, at 68 (“Evidence of the huge loss in number and affordability of 
units to working and poor households is a cost imposed with little in-kind benefit returned to 
society.  During the first decade of Urban Renewal, just one-quarter of the thousands of units 
demolished were replaced–at much higher rents and housing wealthier residents.  The displaces 
almost always incurred higher shelter costs and increased cost burdens relative to their ability to 
pay.”) (citations omitted). 
 20. See, e.g., Uniform Relocation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601–4655 (2000) (first passed in 1970 
and designed to prevent harm to residents involved in urban redevelopment by ensuring that they 
receive relocation and other types of social service assistance). 
 21. See, e.g., Paul Angiolillo Jr., A Town Goes to War Over the Ultimate Truck Stop, BUS. 
WK., Jan. 11, 1988, at 16D; Editorial, An Issue in the Closet, THE CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), 
Mar. 7, 1997, at 14A (“[I]n matters legislative, the most telling details often have to do with when 
and where hearings on important issues are held.  If an issue is controversial . . . to legislators on 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
250 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX:243 
Federal redevelopment laws eventually evolved to address this problem by 
requiring “public input” in redevelopment plans as a pre-requisite for even 
applying for federal funds.  Today, successful applicants for federal 
redevelopment funds must almost always show some level of predevelopment 
public participation in order to qualify for federal assistance.22 
Although this evolution of federal law is a welcome departure from past 
practice, the results are mixed, with most commentators arguing that such an 
approach does not guarantee that participatory planning is truly encouraged 
and realized.23  In addition, while federal redevelopment laws have made some 
progress, evolution in state redevelopment laws over the same period has made 
little to no progress in ensuring meaningful participation by residents. 
III.  PROTOTYPICAL STRUCTURE FOR STATE REDEVELOPMENT LAWS 
Standard state redevelopment laws require public participation at two 
stages of the redevelopment planning process.  The first stage is prior to 
designating an area as being in need of redevelopment, and the second is upon 
the adoption of a specific redevelopment plan for the designated area.24  Given 
 
one side or another, they often seek to limit public input and attention by scheduling hearings at 
inconvenient times and in remote locations.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and 
Independent Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 102-389, 106 Stat. 1571 (1993) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 14371 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993) (effective September 30, 1993)) 
(requiring public participation processes by applicants for “HOPE VI” projects for the 
revitalization of failed public housing developments); 24 C.F.R. § 597.200 (2007) (“The strategic 
plan should: (1) Indicate and briefly describe the specific groups, organizations, and individuals 
participating in the production of the plan and describe the history of these groups in the 
community; (2) Explain how participants were selected and provide evidence that the 
participants, taken as a whole, broadly represent the racial, cultural and economic diversity of the 
community; (3) Describe the role of the participants in the creation, development and future 
implementation of the plan; (4) Identify two or three topics addressed in the plan that caused the 
most serious disagreements among participants and describe how those disagreements were 
resolved; (5) Explain how the community participated in choosing the area to be nominated and 
why the area was nominated . . . . (7) Provide a brief explanation of the community’s vision for 
revitalizing the area.”). 
 23. See Audrey McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of 
Community Participation in Economic Development, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 866–92 (2000). 
 24. See Daniel R. Mandelker, The Comprehensive Planning Requirement in Urban Renewal, 
116 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 29 (1967); Elizabeth Bd. of Educ. v. City of Elizabeth, No. UNN-L-0435-
06, 2007 WL 2891078, at *1 (N.J. App. Div. Sept. 28, 2007) (“Council passed a resolution 
authorizing the City’s Planning Board to investigate ‘if the area adjacent to the Kapkowski Road 
Redevelopment area is an area in need of redevelopment, and, if so, further authorize[d] the 
development of such a redevelopment plan’ . . . . [T]he City’s Planning Board passed a resolution 
‘designat[ing] . . . the Marine Waterfront-Trumbull Street Redevelopment Area . . . as a 
‘redevelopment area’’ and recommended that the Council also designate the area as such.  On 
December 7, 2000, the Council resolved to adopt the redevelopment plan recommended by the 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] PARTICIPATORY PLANNING AND PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS 251 
my definition of participatory planning, this article is focused on the public 
participation at the pre-designation stage rather than at a later stage when a 
plan is being adopted.25  Although many of the participatory planning tenets 
described in this article remain beneficial at later stages of planning, the 
agenda-setting nature of predevelopment planning makes it more effective in 
meeting the short- and long-term goals of participatory planning. 
Standard public participation provisions require public notice that an area 
is under consideration for redevelopment, including the publication and 
mailing of public hearing information to those in geographic proximity to the 
area under consideration, the posting of maps showing the proposed 
redevelopment area and the holding of the public hearing itself.26  There are 
 
Planning Board.”); 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-5 (Lexis Nexis 2009) (“Prior to the 
adoption of an ordinance proposing the designation of a redevelopment project area, or approving 
a redevelopment plan or redevelopment project, the municipality by its corporate authorities, or as 
it may determine by any commission designated under subsection (k) of Section 11-74.4-4 . . . 
shall adopt an ordinance or resolution fixing a time and place for public hearing . . . . At the 
public hearing any interested person or affected taxing district may file with the municipal clerk 
written objections to and may be heard orally in respect to any issues embodied in the notice.  
The municipality shall hear all protests and objections at the hearing and the hearing may be 
adjourned to another date without further notice other than a motion to be entered upon the 
minutes fixing the time and place of the subsequent hearing.  At the public hearing or at any time 
prior to the adoption by the municipality of an ordinance approving a redevelopment plan, the 
municipality may make changes in the redevelopment plan.  Changes which (1) add additional 
parcels of property to the proposed redevelopment project area, (2) substantially affect the general 
land uses proposed in the redevelopment plan, (3) substantially change the nature of or extend the 
life of the redevelopment project, or (4) increase the number of inhabited residential units to be 
displaced from the redevelopment project area, as measured from the time of creation of the 
redevelopment project area, to a total of more than 10, shall be made only after the municipality 
gives notice, convenes a joint review board, and conducts a public hearing.”). 
 25. For a fuller discussion of this latter controversy, see generally Daniel B. Kelly, The 
“Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and 
Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 26. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-6 (West Supp. 2008) (“a. . . . The governing body 
of a municipality shall assign the conduct of the investigation and hearing to the planning board 
of the municipality.  b. . . . (2) The planning board shall specify a date for and give notice of a 
hearing for the purpose of hearing persons who are interested in or would be affected by a 
determination that the delineated area is a redevelopment area. (3) The hearing notice shall set 
forth the general boundaries of the area to be investigated and state that a map has been prepared 
and can be inspected at the office of the municipal clerk.  A copy of the notice shall be published 
in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality once each week for two consecutive 
weeks, and the last publication shall be not less than ten days prior to the date set for the hearing.  
A copy of the notice shall be mailed at least ten days prior to the date set for the hearing to the 
last owner, if any, of each parcel of property within the area according to the assessment records 
of the municipality.  A notice shall also be sent to all persons at their last known address, if any, 
whose names are noted on the assessment records as claimants of an interest in any such parcel 
. . . . Failure to mail any such notice shall not invalidate the investigation or determination 
thereon.  (4) At the hearing, which may be adjourned from time to time, the planning board shall 
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few if any provisions for how a redevelopment agency must consider the 
information gathered at a public hearing aside from a requirement that minutes 
of proceedings be kept in the public record.27 
Although these redevelopment statutes describe the authority of appointed 
planning bodies as recipients of delegated local government powers, most 
statutes require that locally-elected representative bodies such as city or county 
councils play a prominent role in the decision-making.28  The powers typically 
vested in local elected government include the powers to permit an appointed 
planning body to study an area for designation for redevelopment, to approve 
or disapprove the planning body’s recommendation arising from that study, to 
approve or disapprove any specific redevelopment plan arising from the area, 
and certification that such plans conform to local comprehensive planning 
goals.29 
The role of these deliberative elected bodies impacts judicial review by 
legitimizing the planning process.  Participatory planning can add value to and 
deepen this legitimizing function as long as it does not interfere with or replace 
legislative determinations by elected officials.  This combined impact of public 
participation and legislative determination may be seen in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s most recent decision about the limits of economic development 
powers, Kelo v. City of New London.  The Kelo case, and state reaction thereto, 
also point out the need for greater public participation to further these 
legitimizing functions and to increase procedural protections for low-income 
communities targeted for redevelopment. 
IV.  KELO’S RELIANCE ON PLANNING PROCESSES, POST-KELO REFORMS AND 
THE NEED FOR GREATER PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS 
The Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Kelo v. City of New 
London30 engendered a level of public outrage not seen since the Bush v. 
Gore31 decision.  Many urban scholars were generally not as surprised or 
outraged over Kelo as the general public but still recognized the need for 
reformation of urban redevelopment laws.32  Ultimately, Kelo and its aftermath 
 
hear all persons who are interested in or would be affected by a determination that the delineated 
area is a redevelopment area.  All objections to such a determination and evidence in support of 
those objections, given orally or in writing, shall be received and considered and made part of the 
public record.”). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-5 (Lexis Nexis 2009). 
 29. See id. 
 30. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 31. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 32. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 1412, 1423 (2006) (defending the Kelo majority opinion while recognizing that 
“[f]ew takings cases sparked as harsh a reaction as did Kelo.  The decision attracted criticism 
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provide a window into possible reformation of redevelopment laws that 
recognizes the need for greater deliberation, deeper participation, and 
procedural protections for low-income residents. 
A. Kelo in Brief 
Given the extensive literature generated by Kelo, it is only necessary here 
to briefly sketch the contours of the case to get insight into the legal 
significance it places on the planning process.  In Kelo, the city of New 
London, Connecticut, pursuant to a state authorizing statute, exercised eminent 
domain to condemn properties for use as part of a commercial development 
that included, inter alia, a waterfront hotel and conference center, public and 
commercial marinas, a public walkway, 80 new homes, a Coast Guard 
Museum, substantial office space, 90,000 square feet in research and 
development facilities, retail space, and related uses.33 
The development plan required the amassing of necessary acreage through 
use of the city’s eminent domain authority and subsequent transfer of title to a 
non-profit development corporation which would then ground lease the 
properties to various private developers for construction and operation of 
different aspects of the economic development plan.34  The resulting 
development was estimated to create 518-867 construction jobs, 718 to 1,362 
direct jobs and 500-940 indirect jobs after construction.35  The development 
would also contribute an estimated $680,544 to $1,249,843 in annual property 
tax revenues into the city tax coffers.36 
The dispossessed families had land tenures ranging from a few years to 
decades, but each claimed strong attachments to their homes and their 
neighborhood.37  The residents filed suit to enjoin the use of eminent domain, 
received a split decision at a lower court level, lost at the Connecticut Supreme 
Court and, ultimately, lost at the U.S. Supreme Court.38 
The primary issue in Kelo was whether “economic development” alone, 
defined roughly as job creation and increase to the tax base of a community, is 
a sufficient rationale to satisfy the “Public Use” clause of the Fifth Amendment 
to the Constitution, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.39 
 
from commentators of diverse, and often conflicting, political persuasions.  Virtually all 
commentators found the ruling disconcerting, albeit for different reasons. Kelo also sparked a 
political maelstrom.”). 
 33. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474. 
 34. Id. at 476 n.4. 
 35. Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 510 (Conn. 2004). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475. 
 38. Id. at 475–77, 490. 
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”) (emphasis added). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
254 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX:243 
For decades, municipalities used eminent domain powers to take private 
property for economic development planning (most often in clearing 
“blighted” areas that are purportedly injurious to the public health, safety and 
general welfare), and the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed such takings using the 
“rational basis” test giving great deference to municipal and state legislatures’ 
determination of the public purpose behind such actions.40  Despite this 
deference, the Court had never declared economic development alone as a 
“public use” in and of itself. 
The Kelo Court held, 5-4, that the city’s actions and state redevelopment 
law were constitutional because economic development alone may satisfy the 
Public Use Clause.41  To reach that conclusion, the Court majority cited 
precedents indicating that: 1) “public use” is equivalent to the “public purpose” 
for which property is being taken, and great deference has been given to state 
legislature’s expression of the public purpose behind the use of eminent 
domain; 2) private property may be taken by eminent domain and conveyed to 
other private entities, provided that the grantee-private entity uses the property 
to further the “public purpose”; and 3) the Court has allowed the taking of non-
blighted property where the condemning entity found that it was necessary, as 
part of a comprehensive redevelopment plan, to achieve its public purpose.42 
In dissent, Justice O’Connor argued that the precedents relied upon by the 
majority should be read as allowing eminent domain for economic 
development purposes, but only when the targeted properties were “blighted” 
and affirmatively injurious to the public, health, safety, and general welfare.43 
Justice Thomas’ dissent argued that economic development purposes could 
never be a “public use” unless the subsequent transfer of ownership resulted in 
actual public ownership or access to the condemned property.44 
B. The Planning Processes as Legitimacy for Redevelopment 
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion, and the precedents upon which it rests, 
describe the planning process as one of the reasons that the Court and society 
at large should have faith that the use of eminent domain for redevelopment 
comports with a truly public purpose.  In other words, part of the justification 
for the Court’s deference to the state and local authorities’ definition of the 
 
 40. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 
26 (1954). 
 41. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489–90. 
 42. Id. at 488–89 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 35–36). 
 43. Id. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[P]recondemnation use of the targeted property 
inflicted affirmative harm on society . . . [and] the relevant legislative body had found that 
eliminating the existing property use was necessary to remedy the harm.”). 
 44. Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I would  revisit our Public Use Clause cases and 
consider returning to the original meaning of the Public Use Clause: that the government may 
take property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the property.”). 
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public purpose for economic development planning is satisfaction with the 
planning processes itself.  This process, based in state redevelopment law, 
includes a mix of administrative agency action, legislative votes, and direct 
public engagement.  The Kelo Court focuses on the interplay between the latter 
two elements in particular. 
The Court notes the redevelopment authority “held a series of 
neighborhood meetings to educate the public about the [planning] process.”45  
Later in the opinion, Justice Stevens states that “The City has carefully 
formulated an economic development plan [and] . . . [g]iven the 
comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded 
its adoption, and the limited scope of our review, it is appropriate for us . . . to 
resolve the challenges of the individual owners . . . in light of the entire 
plan.”46 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence cites the planning procedures even more 
directly by pointing out that “[t]his taking occurred in the context of a 
comprehensive development plan meant to address a serious citywide 
depression [and] . . . [t]he city complied with elaborate procedural 
requirements that facilitate review of the record and inquiry into the city’s 
purposes.”47 
Undoubtedly, the satisfaction expressed by the majority and concurrence 
regarding the planning process in this case stems largely from necessity given 
the limitations of judicial competence and concerns about substituting judicial 
conceptions about the wisdom and efficacy of public plans for a legislature’s 
determination.48  As a result, however, the Court placed great emphasis on the 
need for careful deliberation as part of economic development planning, stating 
that “[a]s the submissions of the parties and their amici make clear, the 
necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain to promote economic 
development are certainly matters of legitimate public debate.”49 
The implication of these arguments about planning procedures and public 
debate is that one can take solace in the fact that the planning in this case was 
comprehensive in nature, approved by a deliberative elected body and included 
public education and outreach.  One may argue that Justice Stevens’ faith in 
planning is misguided, but it is impossible to gainsay the importance that Kelo, 
and the precedents described therein, place on deliberative bodies, public 
outreach and procedural protections in establishing the legal legitimacy of 
economic development planning. 
 
 45. Id. at 473. 
 46. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483–84. 
 47. Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 48. See id. at 489–90. 
 49. Id. at 489. 
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Within the Kelo opinion and in subsequent interviews, Justice Stevens 
specifically cites the political structure as an alternative avenue of redress for 
those persons aggrieved by the use of eminent domain for purely economic 
development purposes.50  The fact that legislators who approve eminent 
domain as part of a redevelopment planning process must ultimately answer to 
the will of the voters is an important component of the procedural protections 
that Stevens sees at work in these cases. 
Some have argued that Stevens’ faith in this political and planning process 
is naive.51  Certainly, this article argues that the public participation 
requirements must be more thorough and stringent to justify such faith in the 
planning process.  Regardless of one’s opinion about the Kelo majority’s 
success in accurately describing the planning process, any normative changes 
to state redevelopment law should recognize the crucial legitimizing function 
elected bodies have as part of that process.  Unfortunately, many urban 
scholars try to justify increases in participatory planning by unnecessarily 
rejecting the legislative role in this process in favor of direct democracy 
arguments.  Ultimately, such changes undermine the judicial search for 
legitimacy in the planning process rather than enhancing it.52 
V.  DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
Every few years, a legal or planning scholar calls for a reformation of 
urban redevelopment law to allow for greater public participation.53  The 
 
 50. Id.  (“We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further 
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.  Indeed, many States already impose ‘public use’ 
requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline.  Some of these requirements have been 
established as a matter of state constitutional law, while others are expressed in state eminent 
domain statutes that carefully limit the grounds upon which takings may be exercised.”) (footnote 
omitted).  See also John F. Geis, Eminent Domain Controversy Continues to Rock Legislatures, 
233 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 3523, May 18, 2006, at 7 (“On Aug. 18, 2005 Justice John Paul 
Stevens, who crafted the majority opinion in Kelo v. City of New London, spoke before the Clark 
County, Nev., Bar Association in Las Vegas.  He said that the majority opinion is ‘entirely 
divorced from my judgment as concerning the wisdom of the program’ that takes private homes 
for private redevelopment.  Stevens added that Kelo was ‘unwise’ policy.  ‘My own view is that 
the free play of market forces is more likely to produce acceptable results in the long run than the 
best-intentioned plans of public officials,’ he said, while acknowledging the constitutionality of 
eminent domain use for economic development.”). 
 51. See infra note 76. 
 52. See infra note 76. 
 53. See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 12 (advocating the establishment of stakeholder rights and 
Community Equity Shares in Redevelopment); James J. Kelly, Jr., “We Shall Not Be Moved”: 
Urban Communities, Eminent Domain and the Socioeconomics of Just Compensation, 80 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 923 (2006) (favoring referenda rights giving residents a veto over eminent 
domain decisions not involving public ownership or access and providing an alienable right to 
return for anyone displaced by redevelopment); McFarlane, supra note 23 (arguing for 
empowerment and political control theory that emphasizes the recognition of conflicting interests 
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connective tissue for these various approaches is the ubiquitous call for 
“resident control” of redevelopment, but the theoretical framework 
surrounding that control and the means for creating it are incredibly varied.54  
Unfortunately, “resident control” as a goal for participatory planning is at odds 
with the judicial search for a consultative and legislative role in the planning 
process. 
The primary problem with embracing the concept of pure “resident 
control” or “empowerment” is that it is difficult to separate this from “Not In 
My Backyard” (NIMBY)-like resident vetoes over neighborhood changes.55  
Secondly, it ignores the economic reality that outside capital infusions are 
often necessary to arrest neighborhood decline and the inherent limits to what 
cumulative efforts of low-income residents can accomplish in the absence of 
public and private-sector partnerships.  Given the connections between calls 
for “empowerment” or “resident control” and notions of “self-government” it 
is natural that many urban scholars use direct democracy theories as the most 
common justifications for more meaningful public participation in 
redevelopment.56  Unfortunately, as discussed below, this overemphasis on 
direct democracy principles undercuts the role of deliberative legislative bodies 
and the interplay between those bodies and participatory planning that gave 
rise to Kelo’s reliance on the planning process.57 
A. Direct Democracy as Incomplete Theory for Participatory Planning 
In some respects the participatory planning process advocated by this 
article lends itself to direct democracy theories.  Participatory planning 
advocates often share the desire to see low-income communities exercise some 
level of control over their destinies.58  Despite this, the perceived legitimacy 
that procedural protections, found by the majority and concurrence in Kelo, 
could be undermined by too much reliance on such a theory. 
 
and redistribution of power); Georgette C. Poindexter, Who Gets the Final No?  Tenant 
Participation in Public Housing Redevelopment, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 659 (2000) 
(advocating a “right of consultation” to build a sense of community, educate tenants and empower 
them by “giving them a voice”); Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing 
the Central City With Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689 (1994) (suggesting 
resident controlled development via community organizations vested with public powers of 
eminent domain). 
 54. Quinones, supra note 53, at 753. 
 55. See infra Part VII.B.1. 
 56. See, e.g., Kelly, Jr., supra note 53. 
 57. See supra Part IV.B. 
 58. Frank I. Michelman, “Protecting the People From Themselves,” or How Direct Can 
Democracy Be?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1730 (1998) (describing the reason we care about 
democracy generally as wanting “government to be by the people as well as for them – because, 
in other words, we care about people exercising their own charge over the politically decidable 
conditions of their lives”). 
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One of the most recent and effective advocates of direct democracy in 
redevelopment law is Professor Audrey McFarlane.59  Professor McFarlane has 
argued that public participation in redevelopment activities is a species of 
direct democracy that is merely of a “different qualitative nature than the more 
familiar methods of direct democracy . . . such as the initiative and the 
referendum.”60  Professor McFarlane argues that the voting structure of such 
initiatives and referenda are merely replaced with “face-to-face form of 
discourse and negotiation” arising during public participation required by state 
redevelopment law.61  Most importantly for McFarlane, perhaps, is that the 
goal of the participatory interaction is to provide a forum for community 
resistance to more powerful interests represented by the city, developer and 
other non-residents.62 
McFarlane’s argument illustrates the dramatic shift required to justify 
participatory planning as direct democracy rather than as an intrinsically 
beneficial activity within a larger process.  The direct democracy arguments 
create the need to defend and carve out space for direct democracy in a legal 
system designed to protect “voting” as the sine qua non of individual political 
power.63  This is particularly problematic in light of compelling arguments that 
courts react negatively to exercise of such devolved power and favor more 
centralized and legislative decision-making structures.64 
As discussed in Part III above, state redevelopment laws often require 
elected bodies to vote on redevelopment specifically to embed political 
accountability into the planning process.65  A number of state actors have 
 
 59. See McFarlane, supra note 23. 
 60. Id. at 903. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 928–29 (“Instead, meaningful participation (i.e., having a decisive voice in favor of 
issues that may go against the prevailing value placed on economic development) is ultimately 
participation that is really an act of resistance.  It seeks to bring a voice not to tinker with the 
process, but to redirect its emphasis away from uses and developments that gentrify centrally 
located neighborhoods, displacing poorer residents or channeling the resources of the city 
exclusively to the downtown business district to the detriment of neighborhoods that could also 
benefit from the infusion of their fair share of resources.”). 
 63. Id. at 908 (arguing, inter alia, that a further development of a legal jurisprudence of 
direct democratic political participation beyond “one person, one vote” protections is necessary to 
protect public participation in economic development context). 
 64. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING:  BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING 
WALLS 168–73 (1999) (pointing out that U.S. court decisions vary widely in seeing referenda as 
lacking deliberation and cementing prejudices or alternatively as pure democratic exercises that 
see “the people” as ultimate repositories of decision-making power). 
 65. Richard Degener, Mention of Redevelopment Alarms Some in Cape May, THE PRESS OF 
ATLANTIC CITY, Dec. 5, 2007, at C4 (“Council members and City Solicitor Tony Monzo 
downplayed the unanimous vote accepting the plan. . . . Monzo said any changes would come 
before City Council”). 
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resisted referenda as amendments to state redevelopment laws because it is 
such a drastic departure from the current role for elected officials in those 
laws.66  McFarlane points out that critics of direct democracy as a normative 
regime for local decision-making often argue that it lacks deliberation and 
careful thought expected from representative government.67  Given the need 
McFarlane sees to create space for more direct democracy before it can 
effectively provide legal protections for residents impacted by redevelopment 
it seems unwise and unnecessary to moor participatory planning to this narrow 
landscape within democratic theory.  Instead, participatory planning can be 
better understood as complementary to legitimating representative bodies 
rather than a replacement for them. 
In a similar vein, appeals to “empowerment theory” as either a subset of 
direct democracy arguments or an alternative to them, are not sufficient to 
serve the legitimizing function ascribed to planning processes by the Kelo 
court and its precedents. 
B. “Empowerment” as Benefit of Participatory Planning 
Empowerment is a second popular theory but it presents a problematic 
justification for increased public participation in urban redevelopment.  The 
“empowerment” argument is often described in instrumental terms as the 
desired direct or indirect outcome of participatory planning processes.68  This 
argument posits that the planning process must empower residents to take 
 
 66. Saba Ali, Solicitor: State Won’t Allow Eminent Domain Referendums, THE PRESS OF 
ATLANTIC CITY, Feb. 22, 2007, at C1 (“Any referendum, binding or nonbinding, will go against 
the state statute that protects the city’s use of eminent domain in redevelopment zones, said City 
Solicitor Richard McCarthy.”). 
 67. Brief for the Am. Planning Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 24–
25, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108) (“The legislature or its 
delegate must make an actual determination that condemnation is for a public use before 
exercising the power of eminent domain.  We do not believe that a restrictive judicial gloss 
should be imposed on the meaning of public use, or that courts should apply a heightened 
standard of review to public use determinations.  But we do believe it is important that some 
politically accountable body determine that the exercise of eminent domain is for a public use, 
and that judicial review of such determinations remain available, even if under a deferential 
standard.”).  Cf. McFarlane, supra note 23, at 905 (“Direct participation has been primarily 
described and understood in its negative sense, however, through the well-known warnings of 
James Madison.  He urged ratification of the then-proposed U.S. Constitution based on the 
protection that its representative structure and system of checks and balances would provide 
against the dangers and evils of direct democracy.  He wrote: ‘From this view of the subject it 
may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number 
of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the 
mischiefs of faction.”). 
 68. See, e.g., McFarlane, supra note 23, at 918 (“Another set of arguments in favor of 
participation justify citizen or community involvement as a means to political and economic 
empowerment.”). 
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control of their destiny in a manner similar to the arguments embedded in the 
direct democracy arguments described above. 
Unfortunately, many scholars summarily dismiss public participation for 
“empowerment” because the term is vague and belies precise definition and 
scope.69  If one reconceptualizes empowerment within the context of the search 
for a legitimizing function of the planning process, then it can be better 
understood as a potential intrinsic benefit derived from a participatory planning 
process rather than a desired outcome that must result from any “successful” 
planning process.70  Using this understanding, a well-structured planning 
process is intrinsically beneficial to participants if it provides individuals and 
community groups with the opportunity to impact the future of their 
community and to effectuate change despite years of disenfranchisement, 
disinvestment and neglect by public and private actors.71 
In other words, the act of participation planning itself constitutes 
“empowerment” simply by providing a forum for the performance of important 
civic duties, even if it fails to achieve every outcome that a community might 
deem desirable.  Focusing on the intrinsic benefits of “empowerment” allows 
the term, as a theoretical concept, to more easily reside alongside a powerful 
role for elected legislative bodies described in state redevelopment law, rather 
than adopting the instrumental description typically used for empowerment 
theory that all but swallows the role of elected officials. 
This does not mean that the instrumental goals are rendered irrelevant, but 
it does mean that we should measure the outcome of any particular planning 
exercise based on participation in the process rather than requiring community 
agreement with the ultimate decisions voted on by lawmakers.  One may have 
 
 69. See, e.g., Bezdek, supra note 12, at 109–10 (“A remedy premised on equity participation 
reconfigures the ubiquitous yet vague aspects of prior efforts to articulate communities’ rightful 
roles in the community development field – participation, empowerment, and stakeholding – into 
ownership shares . . . . Empowerment of poor people is a much-articulated objective, from grass-
roots claims through the federal and state Empowerment Zone programs enacted in the 1990s.  Its 
meanings vary greatly in practice.”); James J. Kelly, Jr., Refreshing the Heart of the City: Vacant 
Building Receivership As a Tool for Neighborhood Revitalization and Community Empowerment, 
13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 210, 224–25 (2004) (“As a community 
development buzzword, empowerment has already shown surprising longevity . . . . Despite its 
overuse, empowerment still invokes that sense of buy-in so essential to the survival of urban 
communities.”). 
 70. Ken Reardon et al., Participatory Action Research from the Inside: Community 
Development Practice in East St. Louis, 24 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 69, 71–72 (1993). 
 71. FORESTER, supra note 11, at 123 (describing this same benefit in purely instrumental 
terms: “[planning] support is really giving them power, empowering them and exciting them, and 
it’s paying off for the community.  You can begin to see people change in the process: they are 
more likely to voice their concerns.  If they are not listened to, they pursue the point and feel like 
they have a right to do so, whereas before they might not have.  They have learned not to back 
down . . . .”). 
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an intuition that a community engaging in this type of activity will ipso facto 
guarantee better planning and development outcomes, but such outcomes are 
not required for one to support participatory planning. 
With this better understanding of how direct democracy and empowerment 
theory can operate within state redevelopment law as reviewed by courts, it is 
possible to understand ways that the states should reform their planning 
procedures. 
VI.  STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO KELO 
States have responded to Kelo by proposing and adopting numerous 
amendments to their redevelopment laws.72  Justice Steven’s majority opinion 
stated that nothing stated therein “precludes any State from placing further 
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power” or imposing “‘public use’ 
requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline.”73  Thus far, over 40 
states have taken up this challenge and proposed or adopted changes to their 
eminent domain laws to restrict them further than the Kelo court does under the 
federal Constitution.74 
Justice O’Connor wrote in her dissent that “[a]ny property may now be 
taken for the benefit of another private party.”75  Regardless of one’s belief in 
that description, the sentiment behind it briefly united residents of every 
income level in opposing Kelo because the opinion was seen as allowing the 
use of sovereign eminent domain powers solely for attaining some “highest 
and best use” for any piece of private property.76  This unified response was 
short-lived because, instead of banning such uses of eminent domain for all 
economic development activities, many states simply buttressed or created a 
two-tier structure whereby a strictly defined “blight” designation is required 
before eminent domain may be exercised for purely economic development 
purposes.77  These efforts to define “blight” in the narrowest terms possible 
simply ensure that middle- and upper-income property owners will feel safe 
from economic redevelopment efforts while residents in low-income 
communities are the only ones who can be impacted. 
 
 72. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, In Search of Robin Hood: Suggested Legislative Responses to 
Kelo, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 305, 306 (2008). 
 73. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005). 
 74. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 32, at 1418 n.27. 
 75. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505. 
 76. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, We Don’t Have To Follow Any Stinkin’ Planning – Sorry 
About That, Justice Stevens, 39 URB. LAW. 529, 531 (2007) (“For all that appears from Kelo’s 
black letter holding, ‘economic redevelopment’ can be freely used by affluent communities as 
well as distressed ones.”). 
 77. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 2007 Eminent Domain State Legislation, 
http://www.ncsl.org/?Tabid=17584 (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). 
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The result of this dichotomy of property rights based on community 
underlies the need to strengthen procedural protections for low-income 
neighborhood residents impacted by urban redevelopment projects.  This focus 
on procedural rights ensures that, although the substantive property rights will 
still diverge, the overall protections for low-income residents will more closely 
approximate middle- and upper-income residents. 
VII.  PARTICIPATORY PLANNING AMENDMENTS AND OBJECTIONS 
A. Participatory Planning as Procedural Protection 
The academic literature on the intersections of planning and the law has 
long called for deeper and more effective public participation for the reasons 
discussed previously.  The suggestions, however usually revolve around 
changes that enshrine general policies that favor outcomes like “community 
empowerment” instead of specific procedural protections that could arise as a 
result.  Given that state redevelopment law contains incredibly detailed but 
ineffective public participation requirements, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that such language may be amended to enshrine detailed requirements for 
participatory planning.  To some extent this reformation attempts to add real 
teeth to the public participation that Stevens relies upon in Kelo and attempts to 
make such protections live up to their promise. 
My proposal is for state redevelopment law to require three public 
hearings, opportunities for joint agency-participant data collection and analysis 
and at least one public design charrette.  In addition, input received from 
planning participants should be legally presumed to materially impact any final 
revitalization plan adopted by the redevelopment authority.  With such a legal 
presumption, the redevelopment authority should affirmatively have to 
demonstrate such impact to a reviewing court or provide “good faith, reasoned 
analysis” for why such an impact was not feasible.78 
In his Kelo concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated that “there may be 
categories of cases in which the transfers are so suspicious, or the procedures 
employed so prone to abuse, . . . that courts should presume an impermissible 
private purpose . . . .”79  The adoption of clearer and more effective procedures 
in state redevelopment laws can highlight when those cases are before a 
reviewing court. 
For example, state redevelopment law requiring public hearings should be 
modified to require redevelopment agencies to hold an initial public hearing 
that describes the participatory planning process and allows interested and 
 
 78. See, e.g., Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. City of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 367, 
373 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (establishing this standard for upholding environmental impact 
statement determinations). 
 79. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] PARTICIPATORY PLANNING AND PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS 263 
available participants to sign up for a future sessions of data collection and 
community outreach.  Planners collecting data via traditional surveys, housing 
conditions would present that data at a second public hearing, where it can be 
presented to residents and analyzed by participants, with an eye towards 
ascertaining the consensus strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
facing the community. 
Next, the redevelopment authority would hold a design charette to 
determine resident preferences and priorities with respect to aesthetic, 
architectural and design elements involved in any revitalization efforts.  The 
purpose of this session would be to determine whether neighborhood needs and 
preferences align sufficiently to support a redevelopment designation.  At the 
end of the process, the redevelopment authority would provide a written report 
indicating how community input was incorporated into the final determination 
of the redevelopment area boundaries and a report of community preferences 
that presumptively would be included in future adoption of any neighborhood 
redevelopment plan.  The final report would be presented at a third public 
hearing where elected officials would publicly vote to designate the 
community as a redevelopment area. 
These additional procedures provide protection to residents impacted by 
redevelopment in two ways.  First, any time a redevelopment authority is faced 
with procedural requirements in redevelopment law there is the possibility that 
they will fail to meet all of their enumerated obligations.80  As a result, any 
increased burden upon such a redevelopment agency increases the chances that 
residents will have legal recourse if such procedures are not followed.81  
Secondly, unlike a simple public hearing with no requirement to consider 
public opinion, fulfilling obligations like those described herein requires that 
the city engage its planning staff and consultants in a longer and more 
thorough process that does not allow for simple fixes after the fact. 
These procedures offer the opportunity for additional benefits to accrue to 
individual residents and the community.  First, neighborhood residents will be 
better informed than under the current approach because they will have more 
opportunities to hear municipal officials and planning professionals speak 
about potential redevelopment options.  When public hearings require only the 
announcement of a designation or a plan and an opportunity to speak, there is 
no feedback process and residents are left to draw conclusions without any 
dialogue.82 
 
 80. Brief for the Am. Planning Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25, 
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108). 
 81. See infra Part IX. 
 82. FORESTER, supra note 11, at 115 (“Inspired by liberal models of voice and 
empowerment, many analysts unwittingly reduce empowerment to ‘being heard’ . . . . 
Participation is thus reduced to speaking . . . .”). 
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Second, residents who take part in data collection on housing conditions, 
street conditions and surveys of residents start from the same baseline of 
information as the planning professionals.  The usual fights about whether a 
particular parcel is deteriorated or not can be avoided by ensuring that the 
definition of “deteriorated” is agreed upon by community members and the 
redevelopment specialists beforehand and that the determination that a 
particular parcel is “deteriorated” was potentially made by representatives of 
both constituencies. 
Third, by holding several design charettes, residents are better able to 
identify a range of options for neighborhood redevelopment and can 
communicate community preferences by both visual and verbal means to 
ensure that their input is not lost through miscommunication or 
misunderstanding. 
Finally, planning as a generic concept is an activity engaged in by 
laypersons of different socioeconomic backgrounds.  It involves issues, 
language and tools that are readily understood and usable by laypersons after a 
short period of time.  As such, participatory planning provides residents with 
the means to protect themselves from future redevelopment plans that are not 
in the community’s interest by engaging in a new level of discourse and 
deliberation with redevelopment officials.83 
Ultimately, the process that I prescribe will also be beneficial for state and 
local redevelopment authorities because it is more likely to result in 
community support and decreases the likelihood of delaying legal fights.  It is 
possible that the increased time and expense required in the initial planning 
process will be minimal in comparison to the post-designation legal battles like 
those involved in traditional top-down planning. 
B. Objections to Participatory Planning Proposals 
There are a number of obvious objections to my proposal, some of which 
were dealt with in the text above.  However, additional attention is deserved 
for NIMBY84 concerns and the continued desire to equalize substantive 
property rights between the rich and poor. 
1. Not In My Back Yard (“NIMBY”) 
The most frequently voiced objection to any amount of citizen 
involvement in a planning and redevelopment process is that residents will 
inevitably deny the need for any change and protect the status quo.  The 
 
 83. Id. at 143–44. 
 84. NIMBY is an acronym for “Not In My Backyard” and is an all-inclusive term designed 
to cover neighborhood resistance to locally unwanted land uses.  See, e.g., Denis J. Brion, An 
Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
437, 438 (1988). 
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presumption is that residents targeted by redevelopment will have a NIMBY 
mentality and always prefer to obstruct rather than participate in planning.85  
This NIMBY phenomenon, which is extensively discussed by land use 
literature, is an outgrowth of the belief that constituencies involved in planning 
are motivated solely or primarily by self-interest and will oppose any upsetting 
of the status quo.86  There are two responses to this concern when it is raised in 
the context of areas designated for urban redevelopment. 
First, severely distressed communities do not always engage in the 
suburban-style NIMBY described in the most land use literature.87  Suburban 
NIMBY most often involves residents who believe that their investment 
backed expectations require them to prevent the siting of locally undesirable 
land uses (“LULUS” for short) such as group homes, gas stations or other uses 
that are deemed incompatible with middle to high-priced single-family 
housing.88  While some aspects of this commonplace NIMBY exist in any 
community, particularly for traditional LULUS, severely distressed 
neighborhoods targeted for redevelopment often organize in opposition to land 
uses that are traditionally deemed desirable, such as middle-income market rate 
housing, office space or retail.89  More often that not in these cases, the 
problem is not the inherent undesirability of the proposed land use, but the 
inability of the current resident and business population to participate in the 
upside contemplated by the redevelopment. 
At the very least one would have to admit that this is a rather unique type 
of NIMBYism, but I think even that concession overstates the similarities 
 
 85. Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 495, 495 (1994) 
(“It is a syndrome, a pejorative, and an acronym of our times: NIMBY, or Not In My Back Yard.  
It has a political arm, NIMTOO (Not In My Term Of Office), an object of attack, LULUs 
(Locally Undesired Land Uses), and an extreme form, BANANA (Build Absolutely Nothing 
Anywhere Near Anyone).”). 
 86. Debra Stein, Nimbyism and Conflicts of Interest, PUB. MGMT., Aug. 1, 2006, at 31 (“The 
disparity between the high value of current benefits and the lower value of future benefits may 
suggest why it is so much easier for NIMBY neighbors to mobilize citizens to resist change to the 
status quo than it is for project proponents to turn out citizens to testify in favor of change in the 
community.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights, Public Use, and the Perfect Storm: An 
Essay in Honor of Bernard H. Siegan, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 609, 614–15 (2008) (“In the short 
run, these obstructionist tactics often pay handsome dividends to the winning faction.  But the 
entire matter is dogged by a persistent prisoner’s dilemma game.  Each person counts himself 
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next door, hence the NIMBY motto ‘not in my back yard.’  But for each time one small faction 
gains a local victory, others in the community may suffer from a global defeat.”). 
 88. Id.; Gerrard, supra note 85, at 496 (“NIMBY, in its various forms, has three principal 
types of targets.  The first is waste disposal facilities, primarily landfills and incinerators.  The 
second is low-income housing.  The third is social service facilities, group homes and shelters for 
individuals such as the mentally ill, AIDS patients, and the homeless.”) (citations omitted). 
 89. See infra Part IX. 
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between low-income community opposition to redevelopment and traditional 
NIMBYism.  Unlike the pardigmatic NIMBY argument, low-income 
community residents are not simply protecting the status quo, but are engaged 
in a fight over the nature of change so they can participate in it rather than 
simply acquiesce to being moved by it.90  That is the reason that participatory 
planning processes can be successful in mediating disagreements over the 
nature of change even if such processes cannot create a desire for change in an 
otherwise successful neighborhood where the desire does not exist in the first 
instance. 
Building on the previous discussion, participatory planning in low-income 
communities starts with an assumption that the status quo is neither sustainable 
nor desirable for the current or future population of the neighborhood.91  When 
communities characterized by abandonment, high crime rates and substantial 
disinvestment are asked if they want their community to change, the answer is 
almost invariably in the affirmative.92  The entire point of the planning process 
is to develop some rough consensus, not unanimity, about what that change 
will look like and to find ways that it can positively impact current 
stakeholders.  The process does not guarantee that there will be zero holdouts 
(there will certainly be more than a few free riders), but it does tend to isolate 
holdouts as impediments to community progress rather than protectors of 
community desires. 
2. Need for Strengthened Substantive Property Rights 
Over the past several decades commentators have understandably focused 
on remedying the two-tiered property rights structure by eliminating the use of 
“blight” as a rationale for designating communities as being in need of 
redevelopment.93  Notions of equity and fairness, likewise, counsel for equal 
treatment of property owners regardless of their income levels or the relative 
 
 90. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961); 
Kenneth M. Reardon, Enhancing the Capacity of Community-Based Organizations in East St. 
Louis, 17 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 323, 324 (1997). 
 91. JACOBS, supra note 90, at 393. 
 92. See, e.g., Matt Katz, New Cramer Hill Vision: Residents Took a Look At a More Gradual 
Approach, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 17, 2009, at B1 (describing the Cramer Hill 
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redevelopment authority) (see infra Part IX.).  See also Kenneth M. Reardon, Back From the 
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decline). 
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poverty in their immediate surroundings.94  Municipalities and planning 
commentators argue that such notions would harm the very low-income 
communities they seek to empower by removing the government’s ability to 
overcome market failure and arrest the conditions of physical and social 
disintegration that often accompany urban decay.95 
The quest for a middle ground may be trying to reconcile the 
irreconcilable.  The alternative vision described in this paper provides for a 
middle ground by increasing low-income residents’ procedural rights as a more 
effective way to counter projects that do not have the support of current 
residents without preventing government-sponsored redevelopment activities 
altogether. 
VIII.  THE PROMISE OF PARTICIPATORY PLANNING IN ACTION – THE EAST ST. 
LOUIS EXAMPLE 
One of the most basic but powerful examples of the long-term potential for 
community participation in the planning and development process began in 
1991 in two of East St. Louis’ poorest neighborhoods, Winstanley and 
Emerson Park.  The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s Departments 
of Architecture, Landscape Architecture, Urban Planning and School of Law 
came together with community members and city officials to engage in a 
process of discerning the best methods for improving East St. Louis’ most 
underserved neighborhoods.  The planners and neighborhood leaders met first 
to overcome community skepticism and help establish a rapport and credibility 
for joint efforts.96  Over the course of the next several months, the University 
sponsored community forums where hundreds of residents expressed their 
desires and priorities for community revitalization. 
This effort, however, did not end at expression alone and instead delved 
much deeper.  Community members and planners worked side-by-side to 
conduct housing condition assessments and door-to-door surveys and gather 
information from those residents who were unable or unwilling to participate 
in public forums.  Planning and law students helped form a community 
organization and began the process of applying to the Internal Revenue Service 
for tax-exempt status.  Design workshops allowed residents to figuratively 
build the types of homes that they wanted to live in and display their visions of 
their community’s future while viewing and reacting to their neighbors’ 
contrasting visions. 
These planning efforts left the participants certain in their priorities, and 
successful, small-scale neighborhood cleanup efforts left them increasingly 
 
 94. See generally supra Part II and accompanying notes. 
 95. Brief for the Am. Planning Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, 
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convinced that they could undertake more complex tasks.  The first difficult 
project identified by the residents in Winstanley was the purchase and 
demolition of an abandoned, dilapidated home that had been the site of 
numerous criminal activities, including the molestation of two neighborhood 
children.97  The community members took the lead on raising the money 
necessary to purchase the property at tax auction and to convince recalcitrant 
city officials to use scarce municipal funds to demolish the structure.  Once the 
home was torn down, pursuant to their long-range plans, the community 
organization leveraged University resources to raise funds and solicit donated 
materials and labor to build a park on the site for neighborhood children – the 
same children who felt terrorized and afraid when they had passed the lot 
previously.98  One of the most memorable scenes from that effort is described 
by Professor Kenneth Reardon in the following excerpt: 
As [neighborhood] leaders prepared for their presentation, a small group of 
landscape architecture and planning students began meeting with the 
Concerned Citizens of Precinct 19 to devise a preliminary set of design 
guidelines for the playground.  Residents said they wanted the playground to 
serve children under 12, who were often chased out of the city’s few existing 
playgrounds by older children and young adults.  They also wanted the park 
designed so they could keep an eye on their children from their front porches.  
They strongly opposed installing equipment, such as basketball hoops, that 
would draw older children. 
After several of these meetings, the university students developed a 
preliminary set of concept drawings for the playground, which they presented 
at a neighborhood-wide meeting held on the proposed site.  The residents 
attending this meeting pointed out what they liked and disliked about the 
students’ designs.  As the session was about to end, one of the adults suggested 
involving the real play experts – the neighborhood children. 
Soon after, the university students returned to meet with 16 children, aged five 
to 12, to talk about the playground.  The university students began their session 
with the children by inviting them to draw their “ideal” playground on a 40-by-
3-foot section of butcher paper.  The youngsters quickly filled the paper with 
images.  The paper was then hung on the wall, and each child was given the 
opportunity to explain his or her sketch.  After the presentations, the university 
students asked the children to pick out the design ideas they liked best.  Using 
these ideas, the university students helped the youngsters create a preliminary 
site plan for the playground. 
The children’s final design included: a large sandbox, a regulation-sized 
double-dutch jump roping platform, the “world’s tallest” play structure, a 
waterworks, a tire maze and an adult sitting area.  To the university students’ 
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surprise, the youngsters insisted on putting the adult seating area in the middle 
of the playground’s most active play space.  When asked why this was 
important, an eight-year old boy said “Cause our grandparents usually watch 
us after school, and they would never let us play anywhere where they could 
not watch us.”99 
The neighborhood park was one of a series of small first steps at the 
beginning of a two decade long neighborhood planning and technical 
assistance initiative.100  The events described in the excerpt are the tip of the 
iceberg and represent one of many early successes that led to dramatic 
transformation of the civic community in East St. Louis.  Other neighborhoods 
saw the success of participatory planning and engaged in participatory 
planning efforts of their own.  A city-wide coalition of community associations 
successfully spearheaded reform efforts that resulted in the defeat of an 
entrenched political machine and election of a reform-minded community 
organization leader as mayor.101  One of the largest and most successful 
community organizations partnered with a private developer to construct 200-
units of mixed-income housing—the first private housing built in the City of 
East St. Louis in over 30 years.102  The organization’s public outreach efforts 
resulted in the successful negotiation of sale and right of return agreements 
with a number of land owners.  Six property owners refused to sell but when 
the city’s power of eminent domain was utilized to take those properties the 
recalcitrant owners were seen as holdouts, rather than victims. 
Throughout these planning procedures, community residents were not seen 
or treated as adversaries, recalcitrant recipients of neighborhood revitalization 
or as disembodied voices expressing a self-serving or short-sighted desire at a 
public hearing.  Instead, they formed the nucleus of a partnership that saw 
engagement of residents in a deliberative planning and redevelopment process 
as a crucial component in revitalizing communities. 
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IX.  THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CAMDEN 
The participatory planning described by Professor Reardon contrasts 
sharply with the more recent example of public outreach conducted for a 
community development project in the Cramer Hill neighborhood in the City 
of Camden, New Jersey.  The neighborhood of Cramer Hill, one of the most 
stable working class neighborhoods in the city, became the preferred site for a 
$1.2 billion redevelopment plan promulgated by the state redevelopment 
agency, the City of Camden and their private development partner, Cherokee 
Investment Partners, Inc.103  The redevelopment plan contemplated the use of 
eminent domain for the relocation of 1,200 low-income families to make way 
for, among other things, market rate and high-income housing and a golf 
course.104  In his book, Camden After the Fall: Decline and Renewal in a Post-
Industrial City, Professor Howard Gillette, Jr. described the legally required 
public hearing for the designation of Cramer Hill as a redevelopment area as 
follows: 
  What might normally have attracted a dozen or so citizens for comment 
drew three hundred and fifty, half of whom had to wait outside for a chance to 
speak.  The meeting lasted so long it could not be reported in the next 
morning’s papers, and another hearing had to be scheduled for the following 
week.  Held this time in Cramer Hill, the second meeting attracted six hundred 
residents . . . After hearing a host of speakers denounce the plan, including 
long-time white as well as black and Hispanic residents and several businesses 
that had been in Camden for more than one hundred years, the [planning] 
board voted to approve the renewal designation.  The vote was delayed slightly 
when one member of the board asked what the issue was.  Despite having sat 
in the dark through two hours of testimony, he joined other board members in 
approving the renewal designation.  Only one board member dissented by 
abstaining.105 
Unfortunately, this lack of true community consultation and deliberation in 
the planning stages of redevelopment is all too common.  Professor Gillette’s 
description of a decision-maker unclear on the topic up for a vote undermines 
the legitimating function that planning procedures are supposed to provide in 
economic redevelopment law and highlights the need for greater protections 
for residents involved in redevelopment efforts. 
State-mandated public hearings are often conducted to meet the letter but 
not the spirit of the law and municipal officials rarely demonstrate a desire to 
engage community residents in a process of designing, amending or modifying 
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redevelopment plans.  The costs that arise from this failure to engage in a 
deeper consultation are often ignored because opposition to urban 
redevelopment by impacted community residents is viewed as an unavoidable 
cost of doing business rather than a self-fulfilling prophecy resulting from the 
strategic decision to minimize the time and effort required for public 
engagement. 
In Cramer Hill, as in other redevelopment sites, the community opposition 
has led to legal action.106  The Cramer Hill Project was challenged by local 
community groups and residents for, inter alia, violating public notice and 
participation procedures of New Jersey redevelopment laws.107  Fortunately, 
this procedural attack succeeded in temporarily halting the redevelopment 
designation because the redevelopment authority failed to swear in witnesses at 
a public hearing.108  Unfortunately, such victories are largely transitory since a 
redevelopment authority can easily rectify such problems by simply re-holding 
the public hearing in a manner that addresses the minor procedural fault 
without giving additional credence to the previously ignored community 
preferences. 
These actions of Camden redevelopment authorities are not the exception, 
but instead are exemplary of the oft-repeated failure to create avenues for true 
public participation in urban redevelopment planning.  As a descriptive matter, 
top-down planning models of one form or another have been difficult to 
dislodge as the reflexive planning response to economic decline.  Current state-
level redevelopment laws tacitly approve of the non-consultative approach by 
mandating a minimal number of required participatory procedures.109  The 
political cycle creates pressure to provide dramatic turnarounds and “best 
practice” redevelopment plans discussed in the popular media and planning 
literature counsels the planner to follow top-down planning models rather than 
engage in long-term efforts to broaden and deepen participation in urban 
redevelopment.110  However, to do so flies in the face of indications that a 
deeper and more meaningful public participation could result in intrinsic and 
instrumental benefits to low-income residents and communities. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the difficulties, I believe that the benefits of enhanced participatory 
planning outweigh the burdens that it places upon redevelopment authorities 
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and impacted residents.  Of particular legal significance, low-income residents 
would gain a new voice in redevelopment planning and would be afforded new 
protections from destructive renewal efforts that have commonly been used to 
the detriment of urban communities.  As noted by the objections discussed 
above, participatory planning is not a panacea for all of the problems involved 
in urban redevelopment.  However, recent willingness to further define the 
rights of individuals impacted by such activities indicates that now may be the 
time to embrace participatory planning as a better way forward.  State 
governments would do well to heed this call rather than further cementing 
inequitable treatment of low-income communities into redevelopment laws. 
 
